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Esteemed Rector Magnificus, dear colleagues, family and friends
1 Introduction In this lecture I would like to introduce you to the field of Tax 
Assurance (TA). I will start with some background information on the start of the program 
at Tilburg University, followed by a definition and descriptions of the relevant elements of 
TA. I will then discuss the current state of affairs and I will conclude with my expectations 
on what the future will bring.
2 Background In 2008 representatives of the big four accounting firms and 
the Dutch tax authorities asked the Fiscal Institute of Tilburg University to explore the 
possibility of incorporating TA in its master programs. The reason for their request was 
the increasing importance of TA in the practice yet the lack thereof in existing master 
programs. The request led to the launch of the profile TA in 2011, consisting of two elec-
tives (TA 1 and TA 2) and the possibility of incorporating TA in the master’s thesis. From 
the beginning the program has been multi-disciplinary and this combined with its many 
guest lecturers from the practice (the Big Four and the tax authorities) have enhanced the 
program’s  quality and appeal to students. The profile was an instant success and is still 
currently running.
I have been involved in the program from the start as a coordinator and a lecturer and in 
my opinion the success of the TA program is to a large extent the result of the combined 
effort of the representatives of the Big Four and the tax authorities who requested such 
a program. In 2016 Deloitte and the Fiscal Institute of Tilburg University took the pro-
gram one step further when together they founded the Tax Assurance Fund. The fund was 
established for the purpose of taking education and research in the field of TA to the next 
level. I am grateful to the founders of the fund and proud to chair the fund. In my capacity 
as chairman of the fund I will do my very best to fulfill its goals.
3 What is Tax Assurance Although Tax Assurance is a relatively new 
term, assurance by itself is not. In the context of auditing it has a specific meaning. That 
is, an accountant can make an assurance report about something, most commonly a 
set of financial accounts drawn up by a company. The aim of an assurance report is to 
increase the user’s trust in the underlying object of the report.
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Apply this meaning to TA and it can then be viewed as something designed to increase 
the trust in the (correctness of) taxes in a specific case. Initially one can think of the 
position of taxes in the financial accounts of a company. We however view TA in a much 
broader spectrum: that is, anything to do with taxes within a company is within the field 
of TA. Thus, TA not only concerns itself with whether taxes in the financial profit and loss 
account and balance sheet are included for the right amounts, it also deals with the pro-
cess of how these amounts were calculated, how the underlying data were assembled and 
processed and the dependability of  the aforementioned data, the choices that were made 
in setting up the appropriate procedures, etcetera. The choices that were made should 
have been made in line with both the general and specific principles as laid down by the 
management and ultimately the board of the company. Another important element of 
TA in the broader spectrum as we see it, is the impact of the tax position in the financial 
accounts on, for instance, the public and the media.
TA is therefore a wide field of interest which involves many different scientific and practical 
areas. Strangely enough these areas are not taxation, apart from the content. I will elabo-
rate on the most important of these areas in the next paragraph. This broad character of 
TA in combination with my fascination for Science Fiction led to the title of this speech. 
Nexiology is a term used by a writer, A.E van Voght, in a story called The Wonderful Trip of 
the Space Beagle. In this story a space ship sets out on a voyage to explore the universe. All 
categories of scientists are on board, each with its own department. The smallest depart-
ment is the nexiology department and the resident nexiologist is the hero of the book. A 
nexiologist has no expertise in any specific field. He is an expert in integrating the differ-
ent fields of science and come to solutions beyond the grasp of members of the separate 
fields of science. For this reason the established scientists do not take nexiology seriously. 
During the trip all sorts of dangers are encountered. While the traditional scientists can-
not cope with the threats because they only know their own field, the hero, the resident 
nexiologist, can make the necessary connections and thanks to him the voyage is a suc-
cess. I do not claim that TA is the answer to everything as nexiology is in the book, but 
there are certainly similarities in the sense that the combination of skills and knowledge is 
vital to confront the future successfully. Similar to nexiology , TA is about integrating dif-
ferent areas of knowledge to reach solutions for practical as well as theoretical problems.
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4 What are the main elements in TA
4.1 Corporate governance, risk management, internal control, ethics
Generally the start for TA can be found in the principles the board of a company has 
regarding taxation. Good corporate governance demands that the board of a company 
performs risk management. This means they have to identify the main possible risks for 
the company and propose an instrument to deal with this risk (control it). Taxation is a 
main risk as it usually has a big impact on the financial accounts. The financial accounts 
are, amongst other things, a means for the board of a company to be accountable to its 
stakeholders. Issues with a potentially major impact on the financial accounts present a 
major risk and therefore should be dealt with by the board specifically.
So taxation is a possible risk and the board should manage this risk by controlling it. The 
other risks in the company must be controlled as well, so usually the company will set up 
a system for internal control. This internal control takes the form of a framework: a busi-
ness control framework (BCF). Part of the BCF, the part that is concerned with taxation, 
is generally referred to as the Tax Control Framework (TCF). There are several possible 
frameworks. Probably best known is the COSO framework1 that is under constant devel-
opment. In building a TCF the initial input in the system is very important as it defines the 
outlines of the system. This initial input should be provided by the principles as laid down 
by a company’s board. 
In drafting principles a board will be guided by all sorts of things such as legislation and 
regulation, but ultimately the principles have an ethical core2; that is, how the board feels 
the company should behave3. An important aspect is what is known as the risk appetite 
of the board: to what extent is it willing to take risks on, for example, the regulatory and 
legislative front, but also with the media performance of the company. There are even 
separate frameworks to determine the risk appetite in more detail4. If the risk appetite of 
the board is to strictly adhere to the letter of the law in the pursuit of minimization of tax 
cost, this will lead to a different system than if the risk appetite is to avoid all conflict with 
tax authorities at all cost.
1 See the new  exposure draft of June 6, 2016  http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO-ERM-Exposure-Draft-
061416.pdf,  for earlier reports and models:  www.coso.org.
2 See Happé, Multinationals, handhavingsconvenanten en fair share, in Per Saldo, Overheidsfinanciën en 
fiscaliteit na twaalf jaar minster Zalm, SDU, 2007, section 5.9 (p 72)
3 See Tax Assurance (ed. Russo) 2015, Kluwer, Chapter 4.
4 See the Institute of Risk Management, www.theirm.org/media/464806/IRMRiskAppetiteExecSummaryweb.
pdf for a report on the determination of risk appetite.
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At this point, I would like to stress that the responsibility for creating the principles for 
a company, including the tax principles, lies with the board. In the past, taxation was 
regarded as a complex, detailed area in which neither supervisory boards nor manage-
ment boards had any interest. The tax department handled all tax affairs and that was 
the end of that. In such a setting it was quite possible that the board would also leave 
the matter of tax principles to the tax department. This is not as it should be. Indeed, 
the tax department should make sure that the principles are adhered to in the day-to-day 
practice but it is not its responsibility to actually draft them. Obviously because of a tax 
department’s detailed knowledge in the field, it could and, in fact, should be involved in 
the drafting process. This involvement should consist of supplying the information on, for 
instance, the state of the various parts of the company, current and expected legislation, 
available information on other companies in the market, available guidance, etcetera5.
So corporate governance and as part of that risk management and internal control are 
important elements of TA. Ethics play an important part in forming the tax principles 
and through them the input for the control system. The principles are really about behav-
ior and express the behavior the board would like to see. It is in itself difficult to change 
behavior. You can punish bad behavior or reward good behavior or have a combination of 
both. You can nudge or you can shove. Ideally you would like the principles to be internal-
ized so that people abide by them not because of sanction or reward, but because they 
intrinsically feel it is the right thing to do (intrinsic motivation). In this sense all other ways 
to get people to comply are second best and a means to achieve voluntary compliance 
(extrinsic motivation). It is also important to note that internal control is part of good 
governance for the board (in that it has control), it is a good thing for the stakeholders 
(because internal control can enhance the accountability) and it is advantageous for the 
regulators (as there is more (voluntary) compliance). 
Part of having an internal control system is that is has to be monitored. In practice the 
system has to function properly and this must be checked. It is not enough to write down 
all the procedures and implement the system. Constant monitoring is required to make 
sure that the system works, that the input is right, the output reliable, etcetera. Some 
view monitoring as the last step in implementing an internal control system. I tend to see 
monitoring as supervision. The difference between these two views is theoretically very 
significant. That is, if monitoring is implementation, it is a board responsibility. If, how-
ever, if monitoring is supervision, it is a responsibility of the supervisory committee or 
5 Such as the guidance of the CBI, see www.cbi.org.uk/media/2051390/statement_of_principles.pdf or Good Tax 
Governance in Transition, www.vbdo.nl.
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non-executive directors. In each view the internal audit which is probably the department 
that actually carries out the monitoring function will primarily report – and therein lies 
the aforementioned significant difference – to a different person6. I will come back to this 
point in paragraph 5.
4.1.1. What should the control focus on?
An important issue is whether the control should be compliance based or result based. 
This really is a core issue because it requires us to define what is the main purpose of 
control. On the one hand, the board must be in control so it can steer the company. It 
must have sufficient information and input to decide whether the company is going in 
the right direction or needs a course adjustment. On the other hand, many regulators, 
tax authorities amongst them, want companies to be compliant. In theory, both points of 
view should lead to the same measure of control, but in practice the difference in empha-
sis could lead to different systems and different levels of control.
Regulators are generally interested in internal control because they want to rely on it as 
much as possible in their supervision of a company. If regulators can rely on the internal 
controls of a company there is no need for them to (completely) audit themselves. For 
regulators the internal control is ideally based on compliance. In the case of taxation this 
entails filing the appropriate tax returns, paying taxes due, fulfilling any and all other obli-
gations and do all this correctly and on time for all taxes. For a company the result counts: 
can the board declare that it is in control, and do the financial accounts give a true and fair 
view of the company? 
For bigger companies the accounts must be audited by an external accountant. For the 
accountant this is an assurance report: it is designed to increase the trust of users of the 
financial accounts. In his audit the accountant, like the regulators, will review the internal 
control system as part of his audit plan. The criteria of the accountant differ from those of 
the regulators, more specifically the tax authorities. The main differences are materiality, 
national versus international, SME’s versus big companies, and different criteria for tax 
and financial accounting.
Materiality: an accountant does not correct all the faults he finds. If the fault does not 
have such an impact on the financial accounts that a user of the accounts would change 
his opinion if it were corrected, the fault is not corrected. With bigger companies material-
6  See Voorstel voor Herziening van de Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code, www.mccg.nl, principle 1.2: 
Risicobeheersing, in which the internal audit is looked at in detail and my comments in more detail in WFR 
June 2, 2016, no. 7147, pp. 787-791.
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ity can be quite high in absolute numbers as it is usually a percentage of their turn over or 
equity. In taxation materiality as such does not exist. All faults found must be corrected.
National versus international: financial accounts are usually consolidated accounts and 
contain all subsidiaries national as well as international. By contrast, taxation is usually 
based on single accounts and always limited to one jurisdiction. Although taxation can 
also be based on a consolidation of a group of companies, in these cases the group is 
usually not the same as it is for the financial accounts. The scope of tax authorities is 
principally based on a national tax system. The consolidated accounts of an internation-
al company are therefore not always useful for taxation purposes. Another difference is 
that companies in their organization tend to look at divisions and shared services centers 
etcetera, without primarily taking notice of borders between states or legal entities. The 
reporting architecture is then not always usable for tax purposes or at least not without 
significant adjustments.
SMÉ s versus big companies: in big companies, the ownership and the management of the 
company are usually not or only to a certain extent related. This is an important check 
and balance. The board of the company is accountable to the owners, i.e. the sharehold-
ers, and shows this accountability through the (financial) accounts and the audit of the 
accountant. When management and ownership are related or even identical as is the case 
in many small and medium-sized companies, this check and balance does not work. If 
there is no audit by an external accountant (and an external audit is generally not com-
pulsory for SMÉ s), the accounts are even less trustworthy to stakeholders other than the 
shareholder. Tax authorities are a stakeholder as part of the government7.
Different criteria: for taxation purposes a company must comply with all obligations from 
the relevant tax laws. In corporate income tax the tax base is the taxable profit, which is 
usually not the same as the profit for financial purposes. In The Netherlands, the tax base 
is governed by what we call ‘goed koopmansgebruik’, while for financial purposes IFRS 
or national GAAP applies. Although there are differences between these sets of criteria, 
there are similarities too. For example, the amount of goods sold, costs etcetera are prin-
cipally the same. Sometimes for tax reasons exemptions will apply or special rules for 
depreciation or non-deductibility of certain cost. These exemptions and special rules lead 
to timing differences or fundamental differences (often referred to as book-tax differenc-
es) between the taxable profit and the profit for financial accounting purposes. An audit 
for financial accounting is therefore usually not unconditionally usable for tax purposes8.
7 See Tax Assurance (ed. R. Russo), Kluwer, 2015, Chapter 7.
8 For a detailed international analysis see Freedman, Financial and Tax Accounting: Transparancy and Truth, in 
Tax and Corporate Governance (ed, W. Schon), 2008, Springer
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When one considers all the differences between financial accounts and tax accounts, the 
inevitable conclusion has to be that financial accounts can be valuable for tax accounts or 
the audit thereof, but they cannot as yet replace them. The challenge for tax authorities 
then seems to be how to use financial accounts and the work performed in the drafting 
and auditing of them to help reduce the work involved in a tax audit.
4.2 Audit
The term ‘audit’ has already been used a lot. The aim of an audit report is to provide a 
reasonable level of security or assurance that the object of the audit is free of material 
mistakes. It never, however, provides certainty.
Audit is a separate field within accountancy to reasonably ascertain that the financial 
report that is audited, presents a true and fair view. This auditing of financial reports is 
done using certain techniques and tax auditors use a lot of the same techniques to ascer-
tain whether or not the tax accounts comply with the tax regulations9. This is not a big sur-
prise as both type of auditors want to be able to form and express an opinion on a report. 
The only difference is that the criteria for profit calculation are not identical (see 4.1.1.). 
To put it bluntly: both financial and tax auditors want to ascertain whether the accounts 
contain all income and all cost relating to the reporting period. Both auditors will look at 
the internal control of the company and determine how much factual checking they will do 
themselves. The more they can rely on the internal control, the more they can reduce the 
time and effort needed to conduct their own checks10. 
If I focus on taxation, the internal control has been formed in the shape of the TCF. There 
is however no legal or regulatory framework for a TCF in The Netherlands11. The tax 
authorities have taken the position that a TCF is not there for their benefit of them, but is 
there for the board as a means to be in control. According to them the TCF is entity spe-
cific so a framework is neither possible nor necessary. The accounting organizations have 
also not or at least not yet developed a framework or other type of regulation concerning a 
TCF. In other jurisdictions there are developments, legal or otherwise. An example of such 
developments on a national level is the Tax Risk Management and Governance Review 
9   See Tax Assurance (ed. R. Russo), Kluwer, 2015, Chapters 14 and 15.
10  See Controleaanpak Belastingdienst, http://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/cab_
dv4221z1fd.pdf
11 There is no formal regulation but there are publications by the Dutch Tax Authorities, such as the Leidraad 
Toezicht MKB that contain some guidance: http://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/lei_hor_
toez_mkb_branche_dv4081z1pl.pdf en Leidraad Toezicht Grote  Ondernemingen: http://download.belasting-
dienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/leidraad_toezicht_grote_ondernemingen_dv4231z1fd.pdf
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Guide by the Australian Taxation Office12, while on an international level, the OECD pub-
lished a paper on the possible outline of a TCF13.
If formal regulation for a TCF were in place, it would be easier to determine the value of 
a TCF for an audit. The reluctance of, amongst others, the Dutch tax authorities is that 
regulation would lead to ‘tick the box’ behavior. They fear companies would meet the 
(minimum) requirements as set out in the regulation and then expect reduction in audit 
activity where the actual level of compliance might not justify this. That said, other juris-
dictions do have legal guidance at this point so they obviously do not share the aforemen-
tioned fear. Ultimately every ‘translation’ of a standard into a regulation will bear the risk 
that the regulee will modify its behavior not according to the spirit of the standard, but to 
meet only the wording of the standard. To exclude this risk, the quality of the regulation 
should be so high that complying to it automatically means complying to the spirit of it (or 
at least complying to it as much as possible).
In my opinion formal, detailed guidance for a TCF will be hard to achieve in practice. In 
theory an assurance report on the TCF with a materiality that is acceptable for tax author-
ities might be a solution. For an auditor to actually be able to deliver such a report at an 
acceptable price is currently not practically feasible.
4.3 Relationship with Tax Authorities
Companies have always had an uncomfortable relationship with tax authorities. 
Commercially taxes are cost and in general cost are to be kept to a minimum. But then 
there is the legal obligation to pay taxes. In the not too distant past, company policy on 
taxes was usually to pay the least possible within the limits of the law. The letter of the 
law was leading: if it is not prohibited, it is possible and if it is possible why not do it. 
Maybe there is even an obligation for the board of a company to pay the least tax possible 
as a part of good governance. In recent years the notion has developed that companies 
should also take another aspect of taxes into account: it is a very important means for 
governments to finance their policy, such as a working infrastructure, police, hospitals, 
etcetera. If nobody would pay taxes, the infrastructure and indeed civilization as we know 
it would change. This, in turn, could lead to a decline in demand for the products of the 
companies. It is therefore also in the interest of companies that each pays its fair share 
of taxes. The problem then, as opponents of the concepts always like to point out, lies in 
12 See www.ato.gov.au./Business/Large-business/In-detail/Key-products-and-resources/Tax-risk-management-
and-governance-review-guide/
13  See http://www.oecd.org/publications/co-operative-tax-compliance-9789264253384-en.htm and comments on 
it by Lisette van de Hel-Van Dijk in Vakblad Tax Assurance, September 2016, p. 25.
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further defining what this fair share exactly is. The relevant tax laws are principally how the 
legislator has defined the fair share. Ideally, these laws should be so simple and clear that 
there would be no reasonable doubts as to the application of them: letter and spirit of the 
law should be the same. Unfortunately in the practice as we know it this is not (always) 
the case. Legislation is always a battle between providing legal security and doing justice 
to all individual cases. Real life is often complicated, and so too are tax laws, which follow 
the complexity of the underlying issues. Another complicating factor in this respect is the 
fact that jurisdictions compete with each other to attract investments. This competition is 
also present in the field of tax laws.
So what does this mean for the relationship companies maintain with tax authorities? 
Companies are not clients of tax authorities (paying taxes is mandatory and not a choice) 
and they are usually not equal parties in a legal sense. Tax authorities have legal pow-
ers (such as the right to audit) to balance the fact that companies have more knowledge 
about their own commercial processes14. In the past this has led to a vertical cops and 
robbers relationship, but in the last decennium this has slowly changed. Tax authorities 
and companies have come to the conclusion that they have a lot in common and they 
should explore the similarities rather than fight over the differences. Fighting, disagreeing 
on the tax consequences of transactions or other facts, cost on both sides. A tax audit is 
costly for the tax authorities, but also for companies which have to commit internal and 
external resources to this process. Moreover, the audit usually focuses on the past with all 
its subsequent difficulties. 
The new way in interaction between companies and tax authorities is to go from the ver-
tical cops and robbers approach to a more horizontal approach of greater equality and a 
situation of (funded) trust. In this new relationship they both share information as soon 
as possible, so no waiting until the tax return, and try to find a joint solution if possible. 
If a joint solution cannot be found, they agree to disagree on a specific point and ask a 
third party opinion, for instance a judge. This point should be a one of interpretation of 
law and should not be about facts and should not burden the relationship as such. So an 
audit term such as ‘detection risk’ should not be relevant here15. Such a relation has been 
referred to as horizontal monitoring, enhanced relationships and most recently cooper-
ative compliance16. In The Netherlands, when the tax authority and the company adopt 
14 See Stiglitz, The roaring nineties, W.W. Norton and Company, 2003, New York and Happé, 
Contractvrijheid, (ed. Hartlief en Stolker), Kluwer, 1999.
15 Internationally see http://www.oecd.org/publications/co-operative-tax-compliance-9789264253384-en.htm.
16 For more information see Tax Assurance (ed. R. Russo), Kluwer, 2015, Chapter 6.
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this new way of interaction, they formalize their relationship with a covenant17. There is an 
ongoing debate whether this is a contract for private law purposes or (just) a gentleman’s 
agreement. As in the covenant the company commits to sharing information actively with 
the tax authorities, for which there is no legal basis, I personally think the covenant is a 
contract that can lead to obligations for both parties involved.
A major advantage of cooperative compliance for the company is that it has more certain-
ty on its tax position in the financial accounts. Especially the provision for uncertain tax 
positions will under cooperative compliance be limited to cases of agree to disagree. The 
relationship between the company and the tax authorities will be a continuous dialogue in 
which most uncertainties will be dealt with. The position of taxes in the financial accounts 
will be more secure, so there will be more assurance. In short, cooperative compliance 
can be a tool for risk management and can lead to better control of the tax obligation. 
Another positive aspect is that companies or the public might view participation in coop-
erative compliance as a sign of a certain quality standard. Companies can place their rela-
tionship with the tax authorities in the realm of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)18 
and, for instance, place it on their website. This might in a general way have an impact on 
the media presence of the company. 
The advantage of cooperative compliance for tax authorities is that they have less work in 
processing tax returns because these will contain no surprises. The focus is on the here 
and now in cooperation instead of the past on the basis of audits. A possibly negative issue 
of cooperative compliance for tax authorities is that they have to invest more in the rela-
tionship with the companies. This will mean a shift in the way they work and will probably 
lead to additional training for the people involved. Thus far, the balance for the tax author-
ities seems to be positive although there is no empirical evidence yet to support this.
An assumption to enter into a cooperative compliance agreement is that the company is 
in control of its tax obligations or is willing to work towards such control. In other words, 
the quality of the TCF should be adequate. The TCF of the company and the assessment 
of it by the tax authorities therefore is key to the concept of cooperative compliance. If 




18 See Gribnau/Jallai, Good tax governance and transparency: a matter of ethical motivation, SSRN-
id278.120Shansenave.pdf, point 7 where the issue of CSR and taxes is discussed.
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As mentioned in 4.1.1. there is a difference in internal control for SME’s and big compa-
nies. With SME’s the TCF often lacks some of the checks and balances that are present 
with big companies. This does not mean that cooperative compliance is as a rule not 
applicable for SME’s, but it does mean that another approach might be useful. In The 
Netherlands there is a special program for SME’s in which the intermediaries (generally 
accountants) play a major role19. Essentially the inherent weaknesses in the TCF of an SME 
are supplemented by the quality system of the accountant of that SME. The tax authorities 
asses the system of the accountant who can, if the assessment is positive, then apply to 
be an intermediary for SME’s. This is formalized in a contract between tax authorities and 
intermediary. If an accountant has a client which he feels is ready for cooperative compli-
ance, he can submit this client under the contract he has with the tax authorities. For the 
company the advantage is that its advisor is in direct communication with the tax author-
ities and that an audit is therefore less likely. The advantage for the tax authorities is that 
they receive tax returns that have been subjected to a quality control system and need 
little attention. Instead, the tax authorities can focus their audit on meta supervision: they 
will select some accountants and audit the returns that have been filed for their clients.
For the assessment by the tax authorities to admit an intermediary it is very important 
that the accountant has a quality control system that is subjected to some form of exter-
nal supervision. Many accountants are members of a professional organization which can 
organize such external supervision. For accountants who do not have such a network, it 
is in practice difficult to be admitted as an intermediary.  In my opinion the accountant 
that wants to be an intermediary should be able to show his quality system is adequate, 
regardless of whether he is a member of a professional organization.
There are many issues under cooperative compliance that are still unclear. An example 
of this is the fact that a company that does not meet its tax obligations can be faced 
with penalties. Tax authorities usually have some discretionary room in the application 
of penalties to do justice to individual cases. If a company that has entered a cooperative 
compliance arrangement incurs a penalty, will the fact that there is cooperative compli-
ance affect the penalty? Will it be a reason to increase or decrease the penalty? Both are 
possible. Ultimately this will become clearer as disputes arise and case law will appear.
19 See: http://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/leidraad_horizo_toezicht_fiscaal_dienstverl_
dv4071z2pl.pdf
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4.3.1. State Aid
A new element in this field is the State Aid discussion20. If a company has an agreement 
with a tax authority, this should lead to maximum tax assurance on that particular point. 
The tax authorities have committed themselves in an agreement (usually in a ruling of 
some sort) to a certain tax treatment of a certain event under certain conditions. The 
details will be dealt with in the ruling. Provided the company follows the ruling and meets 
the conditions, the treatment should be clear. The European Commission (EC), however 
sees this differently. It maintains that a certain tax treatment could be classed as State 
Aid. In those cases the EC can force the state involved to reclaim the advantage that it 
classes as State Aid. For the company it would mean that, although they have tried to 
reach maximum TA, i.e. a signature of a tax authority, they are still liable. Technically the 
liability is not tax, but State Aid to be repaid. I wonder whether the company having to 
pay back State Aid could claim breach of contract (the ruling) by the state in question and 
have their damage covered. At the moment several cases of State Aid are being challenged 
by states and companies so the end result is not yet clear.
4.4 Content of material and procedural law
As mentioned before the TCF contains the internal control system to comply with the 
tax regulations in its broadest sense. The regulations are found in the relevant tax laws, 
both material and procedural. The material laws are concerned with regulations on how to 
calculate the taxable profit, turn over or transaction and how to file this in an appropriate 
tax return. The procedural laws contain the rules for objections, legal procedures, audits 
and other obligations. This is the input for the internal control system and indeed often 
in drafting a TCF an advisor will start with the legal requirements (from the relevant law). 
I said at the beginning that most of TA is not about tax as such, but this is the part on the 
content of the TCF which consists of the actual tax regulations.
One of the problems is that the TCF should include all taxes. The most important taxes in 
terms of numbers are corporate income tax, value added tax and wage taxes. In addition 
there are property transfer taxes, local taxes, excise duties, environmental taxes, etcetera. 
Further more, the TCF should be implemented for all subsidiaries in all jurisdictions. So 
it is not just the multi-disciplinary nature of TA that makes it a team effort, it is also the 
content that is too much and too divers to be dealt with by one person. To make the job 
of drafting a TCF practically possible, it is usually further divided in a system per tax or 
20  Companies such as Starbucks, Apple, FIAT and more recently MacDonald’s, Amazon and Ikea have been 
granted (forbidden) State Aid, according to the EC. For more detailed information see Smit, BEPS en het 
Europese arm’s length beginsel, WFR august 25, 2016, p. 1084 – 1054.
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category of taxes. The different taxes all have their particular requirements that shape 
the way you can be or can try to be in control. An example is the fundamental difference 
between corporate income tax (CIT) and value added tax (VAT). CIT is a tax on the profit 
of a company over a given period, usually a financial year and the return is usually filed 
after the financial year has ended. There is therefore time to make adjustments if neces-
sary.  VAT is a transaction tax and the return is filed on a monthly basis.  Control in VAT 
is focused on whether the VAT on outgoing invoices is correctly calculated and whether 
VAT on incoming invoices is processed properly. These are usually automated systems 
with many transactions. There is not much room for adjustments: a mistake in the system 
leads to an incorrect invoice and unless this is discovered before the invoice is sent to the 
client adjustment is in practice hard to achieve. TA in VAT is therefore usually closer to the 
administrative processes of the company and focused on monitoring the output.
4.4.1. Fair Play
As I mentioned before, there is a difference between the position of tax authorities and 
that of companies. Tax authorities have extensive legal power to perform their function. 
This power is rooted in formal law and basically entails that companies have to answer 
questions by tax authorities and have to allow audits. This power has the purpose to coun-
terbalance the factual knowledge advantage of the company: it knows what it is going to 
do and what goes on internally and internationally. The difference in legal power is the 
main reason that the relationship between a company and a tax authority can never be 
truly equal not even under cooperative compliance. There are however limits to the legal 
powers of the tax authorities or more specifically on how they can exercise their powers. 
In the Netherlands the Supreme Court21 ruled that fair play dictates that a company has 
to provide the tax authorities with all information except when (part of) the information 
is advice about their own tax position. A tax advice to the company does therefore not 
have to be provided. In practice it can be difficult to decide specifically what falls under 
the ‘protection’ of fair play. The audit file of the external accountant for instance is not 
as a whole forbidden territory to the tax authorities, but part of it may well be. There is 
some guidance on this from the NBA (the Dutch Accountants Organization) which can be 
applied to most cases22. 
21  See Supreme Court September 23, 2005, BNB 2006/21 n.c. Wattel, m.n. De Bont. 
22  Handreiking 1113, www.nba.nl/documents/Tools%20Vaktechniek/NBA-handreikingen/1110-1119/NBA-
Handreiking_1113_Inzage_in_de_controledossiers_van_de_openbaar_accountant_door_de_Belastingdienst_
Vapril-16_(layout).pdf
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4.5. Developments in society
The outlook of society on the subject of taxation has altered in the last decade. I already 
mentioned this in describing the relationship between tax authorities and tax payers. In 
general there is a tendency to be more transparent and to be accountable in more ways 
than just financially. The opinion of the public is something companies increasingly take 
seriously, although this is not necessarily a good or dependable development.  An exam-
ple is the Starbucks case, where there was a (brief) buyers boycott because Starbucks did 
not pay enough tax. I cannot help but wondering what would happen if they announced 
that they would increase prices to finance the paying of taxes. There might be a boycott 
again but for different reasons. Another point is that companies which do not (directly) 
supply private customers are less vulnerable to public opinion, a difference that does not 
seem balanced. So the public opinion is not always a fair or dependable factor which 
makes it hard to deal with. In contrast: revelations by more serious media as a result of 
investigative journalists (Panama Papers, Bahama Papers) are a welcome addition to the 
field of transparency23.
Transparency is also an issue for (institutional) investors. In a report Schroder concluded 
that Apple might not be such a good investment because its tax policy is not sustain-
able24. Perhaps the voice of investors will be stronger than the voice of the public in gener-
al since the former’s impact on share value is potentially higher.
Internationally the OECD and EU have their own plans regarding taxation: more transpar-
ency and less BEPS. I would like to add that this will in my opinion only work if there is 
international coordination instead of competition between states. To gain a higher level 
of TA boards of companies will have to take these developments into account. They might 
adjust their policy and/or risk appetite and this will have its impact on the TCF. For exam-
ple, suppose that a certain tax structure is possible legally and will lead to a tax saving, 
although it is not entirely sure whether it is in line with the spirit of the law. Should the 
board implement this structure or should they take the spirit of the law into account? 
Another way of looking at this problem is to view the long term effects and costs. If the 
structure does not comply with the spirit of the law, the relevant legislator might change 
the law and the structure will possibly loose its advantages or it may require addition-
al costs to adapt. This might also lead to the decision not to implement the structure 
although it is possible legally. These are extrinsic motivations that will hopefully (one day) 
lead to intrinsic motivation.
23  Such as the international consortium of investigative journalists, who are (co)responsible for the Panama 
Papers and most recently the Bahama Papers, for more information see www.offshoreleaks.icij.org.
24 See www.schroders.com/en/uk/tp/article/?id=a0j5000000BF05sAAD.
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5 Where are we now? In order to gain an understanding of where we are 
in the current developments in TA I will go through some of the steps necessary to build, 
implement and maintain a TCF, in essence a summary of my earlier remarks. 
• Principles:
The first step is to ensure the input for the system; in other words, determine the tax 
principles. If the company does not have any, or they are not explicitly put on paper, they 
should be made and recorded. This is a board responsibility, but they will probably need 
input from the tax department on detailed areas. It is vital that the principles are in line 
with the general principles and with specific principles on other subjects if applicable. 
The principles should be something to strive for, but if complying with a specific principle 
is not always possible under all circumstances (which is usually the case), this could be 
included. If it is a work in progress, this should be reflected in the wording. Corporate gov-
ernance rules demand principles but they do not explicitly demand that they are public. 
I think that the principles should be public, so the stakeholders can measure the perfor-
mance of the company against its principles. In that sense I believe it is vital information 
for the stakeholders. Tax authorities increasingly take an interest in a company’s tax prin-
ciples. Even if these are not public, tax authorities can always ask for them and currently in 
some jurisdictions already use them or plan to use them in for instance access to cooper-
ative compliance. A good example is the UK, where a report by the tax authorities reveals 
the importance of principles for tax compliance25.
• Some characteristics of principles:
In The Netherlands and the UK principles are usually public and can be found on the 
websites of companies26. US companies that are in the news with tax issues usually do 
not have public principles. Generally published principles contain the wish to comply to 
the relevant tax laws, for tax to follow the business, to have a working relationship with tax 
authorities and to respect the spirit as well as the letter of the law (not always). A remark-
able point is that some companies feel free to use tax incentives if jurisdictions make 
these available. An example of such an incentive is the existence of an IP or innovation 
box in a certain state (essentially a subsidy to attract certain investments hidden in tax 
laws). In these cases tax does not always follow the business, but apparently the fact that 
the jurisdiction facilitates this behavior makes it justifiable for the company. It is difficult 
to argue that this is not right and it supports my claim that incentives should be dealt with 
25 Report of HMRC, Exploring Large Business Tax Strategy Behaviour, July 2015, www.gov.uk/government/pub-
lications/exploring-large-business-tax-strategy-behaviour.
26 See in more detail Russo, Fiscaal Beleid en Corporate Governance, TFO January 2015, no. 136.
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supra nationally. Another important issue is that in my opinion the tax department should 
be a staff department and not a profit center27. The tax department as profit center is not 
reconcilable with the principles mentioned above (especially not with the principle that 
tax should follow the business). 
• Identifying risks per category of taxes:
CIT: recording of the data processes, adjusting the data for tax purposes (differences book-
tax), identifying events that might trigger tax liability or tax saving possibilities, etcetera;-
VAT: recording of incoming and outgoing invoices, reviewing the correctness of VAT on 
them if applicable, identify events that might lead to problems or possibilities, etcetera;
Wage taxes: follow personnel from hiring to firing, check incentives and expenses for wage 
tax consequences and make sure that all relevant (administrative and legal) details are 
met
From this sum up it is evident that taxes are connected to all other parts of the company. 
CIT is closely related to the financial accounts (the finance department), VAT is more con-
nected to sales and procurement, wage taxes belong in the field of human resources and 
so on. The tax department must therefore be connected to all departments.
• Implementing an internal control system (hard and soft):
To control the risks a control system must be implemented. It is important that this is not 
just a handbook in which all procedures have been written down. It should be carried by 
all people involved, especially management, so that it is always used.  The control system 
should also take into consideration soft controls. People working with it should have an 
environment in which they can safely comment on the system and stop if a fault has been 
detected even if this is commercially not attractive at that particular time. It is the respon-
sibility of senior management to create this environment. One of the ways they should 
attain this, is to lead by example.
The extent of automatization is important on many levels. In the recording cycle many 
data are recorded, but not all are available in a structured format. Especially in the case 
of a multinational company with many subsidiaries and its many investments and divest-
ments every year, not all systems applied will be compatible. To structure these data so 
they can be processed properly is a problem for the financial recording and reporting, but 
also for the tax recording and reporting. Another aspect of IT is the input for automated 
administrative processes in the company, an example of which is the invoicing. The input 
27 This issue specifically in the VBDO publication ‘Good Tax Governance in Transition’, guiding principle 2.
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should lead to correct invoices for VAT purposes for all possible situations. A last aspect 
of IT can be found in its monitoring function. Traditionally this is done by sampling, but 
there are many new IT based techniques such as data mining and the new techniques will 
largely replace sampling eventually.
• Monitoring the working of the internal control system:
Monitoring whether the system functions properly can be viewed as the last step of the 
implementation of an internal control system. It can also be viewed as supervision of the 
system. I tend to the last point of view. Assessing a system is preferably not done by the 
same persons who implemented the system. Therefore in my opinion monitoring, which 
is generally done by the internal audit, is a form of supervision. If the monitoring leads 
to the discovery of weaknesses or faults in the system, these faults should be corrected. 
More importantly, the system should subsequently be amended in order for the fault or 
weakness to be eliminated from the system.
In practice there are several problems associated with monitoring. In the first place it 
does not always happen. Companies implement a system and that is it. Obviously any 
change - and in taxation there are many changes every year such as applicable rates and 
changing legislation - must be reviewed to decide if and if so how the system should be 
adjusted. If this does not happen, the system is no longer adequate. Another problem 
is that the internal audit does not always have the necessary tools to monitor the TCF. 
This is a matter of supplying sufficient funds to internal audit so they can function on a 
satisfactory level.  This means that internal audit should not only have enough personnel 
but should also have the funds available to get a second opinion from a third party, if the 
situation so requires. To take this one step further: I think internal audit should report 
primarily to the supervisory board. For internal audit to report to the board which is also 
subject to their audit is in my opinion a weakness in the system.
• Adjusting the internal control system if the monitoring reveals flaws in the system:
It seems obvious that the internal control system is amended in case flaws are discovered. 
In practice, however, there can be many, often commercial, reasons not to amend the sys-
tem at that particular point in time. I can imagine that the report of the internal audit can 
be very interesting literature for any external auditor, such as an external accountant or a 
tax auditor. If a company has entered into a cooperative compliance agreement with tax 
authorities I think there is no doubt that the report should be discussed. I think this would 
be a good way for a company to show its level of control. It shows its weaknesses, but also 
its reactions to the weaknesses, which I think shows strength and builds trust.
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• Making sure that tax is connected with all business decisions
Apart from getting the process of taxes in the business right I would like to stress this 
point separately. When a business decision is made that has potential tax consequenc-
es, these consequences should be considered, including the possible media exposure the 
aforementioned consequences may entail. If for example the board of a company intends 
to acquire another company, the tax principles of this last company should be brought 
in line with those of the new parent company. If the tax principles are not in lines with 
those of the parent company and questions are asked in the media, the board should be 
prepared to answer these, for instance: we know that currently the tax principles are not in 
alignment with the parent company’s, but we plan to change this. Before the board makes 
such a statement, it has to be certain that alignment is feasible. If it is not possible, maybe 
the acquisition is not a good idea. The strategy and choices should be clear prior to the 
investment. 
• Management control
Usually there are different systems for management control and financial control28. I talked 
mostly about financial controls. Management control focusses more on key performance 
indicators (KPI) and how to manage them. If the profit is a KPI for a manager and relevant 
for his bonus, he or she has an interest in profit levels. As tax are a cost commercially, 
there is consequently an interest in the level of taxation. This might induce managers to 
minimize (tax) cost in a way that is not in line with the tax principles of the company. The 
board has to recognize this and deal with it. This might mean adopting a different KPI or 
have an extra control on the calculation of the profit, for instance by the internal audit. In 
general I think that the board must be aware of the consequences of their management 
control system and control these consequences accordingly.
6 Where will we be in years to come? The world is chang-
ing and taxation will be changing with it. This is nothing new. It is harder to think of the 
actual form these changes will take and their influence on taxation and TA in particular. 
Nevertheless, I will make an attempt and when I end my scientific career I can compare 
with the situation as it will exist then.
• IT: an easy trend is to predict that IT will continue to develop. However, the concrete 
influence of those developments on taxation and TA is harder to imagine. Certainly data 
28 See for a discussion on the tax perspective and the management control perspective on a specific subject 
(transfer pricing) Tax Assurance, chapter 13.
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will be more and more structured: they will be available digitally. Taxation will be more and 
more viewed as a process with input of data to lead to output: a tax return or some other 
report. There already exists a strong link between financial reporting and tax reporting. 
Many data from finance form the basis for the data for taxation. I believe that technology 
will enable companies more and more to integrate tax in their financial data so that man-
ual adjustments will become less needed and eventually not needed at all. So technology 
will have an impact on reporting, but also on monitoring and controlling the input for the 
systems. The work for tax experts will shift to the input side and architecture of the IT 
systems where taxation is concerned. The output will be much more automated and sub-
jected to automated monitoring techniques. Tax experts will in my view always be needed 
to solve the problems the systems identifies. 
• Convergence of financial and tax criteria: the integration of tax data with financial data 
will be easier if the criteria for calculating the financial and the tax profit have the least 
possible differences. Currently there are many differences between the financial and tax-
able profit leading to many inefficiencies. The good news is that converge of both sets of 
criteria is possible without too many problems because there exist already many similari-
ties between them29. The bad news is that the difference in purpose between the financial 
and the tax accounts in the opinion of many make the convergence not desirable. I hope 
that both sets of criteria will converge as the problem of differences in purpose only 
exits in certain areas. For the moment, these differences can remain, for instance, differ-
ences in pure tax measures such as participation exemption or commercial revaluations 
through other comprehensive income. Obviously the concept of materiality, which does 
not exist in taxation, will also remain a problem to be solved. At this point technology too 
can play an important part. The audit files will contain a lot of information on the faults 
that have not been corrected for lack of meeting the materiality criteria. This information 
should find its way to an adjustment for tax purposes. As far as the internal controls are 
concerned, the same applies to the reports of the internal audit. These reports should 
also be shared with the tax department and it, in turn, should probably share the reports 
with the tax authorities, especially if some form of cooperative compliance is applicable.
• Supranational coordination: I think tax competition between states is not healthy as 
it will ultimately lead to erosion of income from taxation for these states. This 
competition can only be solved if coordination takes place on a higher level. Many of you 
know that I like Star Trek, also from a tax point of view: a world government with a global 
tax system that would decide on a global scale where help (if necessary in the form of 
29 See Rapport Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap no. 254: GKG Quo Vadis
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limited taxation but preferably in the form of subsidies) is needed. A good starting point 
practically would be to have a common tax base in the EU, for which a draft directive 
already exists. If it would also include the rate (or at least a minimum) competition with 
taxes between member states of the EU would be very limited30. Evidently it cannot be 
more than a starting point if other jurisdictions do not join the common base. This com-
mon base, with reference to the previous point, should be as close as possible to the 
commercial rules for calculating the profits31.
• Transparency: Coordination and technology will both make transparency more and 
more the norm. Although this is in principal a good development, it does have its 
darker sides. Companies should be able to minimize their cost, including their tax 
cost, as long as there is no artificial aggressive tax planning involved. Normal tax 
planning, that is, the avoidance of double taxation, should not be treated in the 
same way as artificial aggressive tax planning or be viewed as such by a public/
media that sees everything due to transparency but is not always able to tell the dif-
ference32. It is easy to bash all multinationals and their advisors in general but this 
could be counterproductive for those companies and their advisors that do not active-
ly seek aggressive tax planning. In a transparent world the principles of the company 
and the way the board treats these principles will become more and more important.
• Possibilities of people: our challenge now is to train people, tax experts, in TA, and 
give them the tools necessary to face current problems. In the future people will 
be educated straight away in TA and I am sure they will think of things that I now 
am not able to come up with. They will be trained to think in a multi-disciplinary way 
from the start, they will have knowledge of IT and taxation and will be able to com-
bine this all. Like many of you, I myself have been educated in the traditional way 
too and although I know something about TA I think I may have restrictions they 
will not have. Axiomatically I do not know what this is, I just expect it to be there.
30  Although it is difficult to agree on a joint approach because there is a lot of distrust between member 
states (see Financieel Dagblad april 14, 2015, there is also a proposition by France, Germany and Italy on 
a minimum  corporate income tax (see Financieel Dagblad may 27, 2015). There is however no official 
amendment to the draft proposal for a common tax base (yet).
31It is not just the EU or the OECD that call for coordination, the IMF has the same remedy, see the IMF Poli-
cy paper of May 9 2014, Spillovers in international corporate taxation.
32  See Essers, Aggressive tax Planning, international tax justice between Machiavelli and Habermas, Bullletin 
for International Taxation, February 2014.
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• Research: the research will focus on the areas that have been mentioned above. 
Concrete current subjects are case studies into the actual application of internal control 
for taxation, cooperative compliance in SME’s, technological changes in audit tech-
niques specifically for taxation (data analytics and mining), developments in cor-
porate governance and more specifically tax governance, empirical research on the 
(changing) level of compliance and the correlation with cooperative compliance. 
• Concrete expected changes: 
TA in the future will develop as society develops. More specifically I think the tax return, 
certainly in its present form, will disappear. Country by country reporting in the financial 
accounts will make it obsolete. This is one of the reasons that tax education must be 
more integrated with financial reporting. Also transparency issues like country by country 
reporting will make more comparative research possible. Tax education will have to focus 
more on IT skills, internal controls and the similarities with financial accounting (rather 
than stressing the differences). Tax audits will become more integrated with audits by 
other government agencies33 and external audits. Tax audits will also become more inter-
national as tax authorities of various jurisdictions will increasingly work together and/
or will increasingly rely on each other’s work. Transparent and public tax principles will 
become increasingly important for companies to have and to adhere to under pressure of 
governments and media (extrinsic motivation). I hope this will eventually lead to intrin-
sic motivation. The legislative process should be supra nationally coordinated and the 
practical implementation for companies as well as tax authorities should be an integral 
component of the legislative process. I expect that some form of further regulation of the 
TCF will take place, preferably on an international level, but I do not expect it to be very 
detailed.
 
33 Such as the DNB and AFM. See for a recent example of interest for taxation by DNB a paper for Dutch 
Parliament https://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/commissievergaderingen/details?id=2016A02393
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